Abstract. This paper addresses two modi of analogical reasoning. The rst modus is based on the explicit representation of the justi cation for the analogical inference. The second modus is based on the representation of typical instances by concept structures. The two kinds of analogical inferences rely on di erent forms of relevance knowledge that cause non-monotonicity. While the uncertainty and non-monotonicity of analogical inferences is not questioned, a semantic characterization of analogical reasoning has not been given yet. We introduce a minimal model semantics for analogical inference with typical instances.
Introduction
Analogical reasoning is a process whereby similarities between a source and a target are used to infer the probable existence of further similarities. Thus, under certain conditions, an analogical inference can be employed to provide a description of an aspect of the target, if the description of the same aspect is known for the source.
What are the conditions that justify an analogical inference? There are several answers to this question, but most of them agree in characterizing some relevance knowledge as a justi cation for analogical inferences. Goebel 12] , for instance, emphasizes some relevant similarity as the knowledge required for an analogical inference. Gentner 9] prefers by her systematicity criterion a mapping of predicates which are connected by a higher order relation explicitly to be known for analogical inferences. The higher order relations she examined, namely cause and implies, actually represent relevance knowledge of the form \aspect A 1 is relevant for aspect A 2 ".
The maybe best-recognized proponent of justi cation is Russell, who de ned the so-called determinations as the crucial relevance knowledge. His total determinations represent a strict form of connections between two aspects, expressing \the values of a predicate A 1 determine the values of a predicate A 2 ".
Let us look at an example: Knowing that the car car S was produced in 1990, that its make is Honda-civic, and that its price is 13,000.00 DM you would infer analogically that a car car T which was produced in 1990 and the make of which is Honda-civic would probably cost about 13,000.00 DM. The relevance knowledge that justi es this particular analogical inference is the determination of the price of a car by its make and year of construction. But what happens if you gain the additional knowledge that car T is rusty and was involved in many severe accidents? Then you would no longer infer the price of 13,000.00 DM for car T . This example provides a clue for the non-monotonicity of inferences called connection-based analogical inferences. For understanding the non-monotonicity of another kind of analogical reasoning, remember the classical Tweety story of non-monotonic reasoning: In this story the non-monotonicity has a lot to do with the break down of an inheritance in the concept \bird". In (semantic net and frame) representations that use prototypes, such as the TypicalElephant of 4], certain analogical inferences provide new information by copying facts from the prototype to the individual. Even though known as \inheritance", actually this reasoning is another common kind of analogical reasoning, which we shall call typical-example-based. As the Tweety story shows, it is non-monotonic as well.
Analogical inference is commonly considered to be non-deductive, hypothetical, tentative, and non-monotonic. These features of analogical reasoning have been addressed explicitly in 12, 13, 24, 19] and implicitly presupposed in many approaches to reasoning by analogy. Other questions have usually been the center of attention of analogy research though. We discuss the additional justifying knowledge needed for inferring a further similarity from a similarity of a source and a target for two kinds of analogical reasoning. We propose how to represent this knowledge and present a semantic characterization for the analogical inference with typical instances that is actually designed for non-monotonic logics. This paper is organized as follows: We rst recall the basic ingredients of connection-based analogical reasoning. Then we introduce analogical reasoning based on typical instances, which makes use of an exemplary knowledge representation. We present the inference schemas for the two forms of analogical reasoning and discuss a semantic that is appropriate for the analogical inference with typical instances and which captures its non-monotonicity. At last we propose a hybrid framework integrating these two forms of analogical reasoning using a hybrid knowledge representation 3 .
Connection-Based Analogical Reasoning
An important concept in analogical reasoning is the so-called aspect. In many approaches to computational analogy, aspects are represented just by predicates or xed formulae. In order to capture a wider range of analogical reasoning and to include inter-domain analogies, we de ne an aspect A as a partial function, mapping the individuals (instances c of a concept C) to non-tautological formulae with at most one free variable x such that Ahci x=c] is true 4 .
Informally speaking, if c is an instance and A an aspect then Ahci is a formula describing A of c. For example: The value of safetyhci of a car c might be airbag(x)^antiblock(x)^max speed(x) < 100. It is assumed that airbag(c)^antiblock(c)^max speed(c) < 100 is true. For a bicycle b, safetyhbi might be frame diameter(x; 3)^age(x) < 10. 6] . In modeling human analogical reasoning, the relevance knowledge must allow for exceptions and uncertainty rather than being a logical implication or a total determination. In the following we use the most general notion, connection, that does not require a speci c representation and may have exceptions.
A connection is a pair of aspects A 1 ; A 2 ]. An example of such connections is population; cars] expressing \if two cities have the same number of inhabitants, then probably the same number of cars is registered in the cities". This connection is used in an analogical inference that yields a value of the aspect cars for the target instance Rome. This inference takes as inputs the similarity of Rome and another city, say Madrid, with respect to the number of inhabitants and the connection. It infers the correspondence of Rome and Madrid with respect to the aspect cars. Using the additional information of the actual value of carshMadrid i the value of carshRomei can be inferred.
Utilizing connections, the connection-based analogical inference can formally be described by the schema Note that Ahci is a formula with a free variable x. Ahci x=c] denotes the formula Ahci in which the free variable x is substituted by c.
are responsible for the non-monotonicity of the connection-based analogical inference.
But, what happens, if such explicit connections are not available? The kind of analogical inference presented next allows for justi ed analogical reasoning that is not necessarily based on explicit connections. 5 3 Analogical Reasoning Based on Typical Instances Russell 24] tries to interprete analogical inference based on typical instances as a connection-based inference with \belonging to the same class" as the aspect A 2 of a connection A 1 ; A 2 ]. However, psychological investigations provided evidence that typical instances are the only, or at least the preferred sources for analogical reasoning corresponding to inheritance among instances of a concept. Consequently, connection-based analogical inference does not cover analogical inferences which can have only a typical instance as the source rather than an arbitrary instance.
The typicality of instances of concepts is a phenomenon investigated in empirical psychology 17, 20, 23] . Reproducible typicality ratings that distinguish typical instances have been found. Some experimental methods 17] for the extraction of this typicality rating are the direct rating of representativity, the examination of the reaction time to decide whether an instance belongs to a category, the test of the reproduction of instances, and the use of instances in generalizations and in analogical reasoning. Hence you nd the notation structured concept in the psychological literature that refers to a set of instances with a typicality relation which we denote 6 by v C . The notion \concept structure" denotes the structure of one single concept rather than the relationship between di erent concepts like in kl-one. The typicality relations v C compare for each concept C the degrees of typicality (for example, a hammer is commonly considered a more typical tool than a compass saw) of similar instances. Within such concept structures we de ne typical instances: For example, a hammer is commonly considered a typical tool and a violin a typical musical instrument. An example of a concept structure is given in gure 1. There are two kinds of aspects of typical instances: aspects that are important for the typicality of the instance (e.g. the size of a city) and aspects that are accidental (e.g. the number of research institutes of a city). Of course, justied analogical reasoning transfers only relevant information. This motivates the 5 Although the eld of analogical reasoning is concerned with reasoning based on examples, surprisingly the importance of reasoning by typical instances, as for example, investigated by Rosch 21] and Lako 17] , has not been elaborated. Only an attempt of Winston 30] was in uenced by statistic prototypicality. 6 The subscript speci es the concept. 
A Semantics for Analogical Reasoning with Typical Instances
The common way to cope with the meaning of logical formulae and inferences is to nd an appropriate semantics. For classical logic, the Tarski semantics has been de ned, for modal logics, Kripke semantics proved to be appropriate. Several semantics have been developed for non-monotonic logics, e.g., Shoham's minimal model semantics. We shall relate the analogical inferences based on typical instances to this minimal model semantics by introducing interpretations which are compatible with the concept structure and by de ning a partial order on these interpretations.
Let @I be a partial interpretation of formulae, that assigns to each pair (instance, formula with one variable) one of the values true,false,unknown. It can be thought of as the result of an inspection of the instances. In the case of our city example @I(Rome; no of inhabitants(x) = 3million) = true since a corresponding entry can be found in the concept structure. In contrast @I(Rome; no of cars(x) = 1million) = undef, since there is no entry for cars in the instance of Rome.
More precisely, for the following we assume a sorted ( rst-order) logic L, where each sort can be viewed as a concept like car or city. We denote the sorts by lowercase Greek letters such as or . E is a set of sets fE g , where each E is called the set of examples of sort . The E are such that their structure corresponds to the sort structure of L, that is, if v (i.e. is subsort of ) then E E . E forms the frame (the collection of universes) for the partial interpretation of the terms. @I is a xed partial interpretation function (corresponding to three-valued strong Kleene logic L K 16, 28] The semantics of^, ), ,, and 9 can then be de ned in the usual manner.
Note that these de nitions do not assume a concrete representation of the examples|the only requirement is that we get an answer to certain questions, thus xing the interpretation function. In other words, @I has to be e ectively computable for all ground formulae (i.e., variable free formulae) and, consequently, for all formulae, since we assume the number of examples in E to be nite.
As usual, we give an (extended) set theoretic semantics for a formula set. Our semantics is such that it is compatible with the examples. An interpretation of a knowledge base is de ned as an extension of the partial interpretation, given by hE; @Ii. Definition (hE; @Ii-Interpretation): Let E = fE g be a given set of example sets and let @I be a partial interpretation function in E. An So far all possible interpretations I have to be considered for modeling formulae. This is su cient for capturing deductive reasoning as shown in 15]. However, in order to model any form of non-monotonic reasoning (in particular analogical reasoning), each conclusion drawn must potentially be withdrawn. In order to describe non-monotonicity semantically, Shoham 25] has introduced an order on the interpretations and weakened the notions of satis ability, of consequence etc. His key idea is to only consider distinguished minimal models for the satis ability and consequence relations. This approach is well-suited for analogical reasoning which is based on preferred instances|the typical instances of a concept. Nota bene: While the optimal models in Shoham's approach are minimal, the typical instances are maximal with respect to the typicality relation. 8 In an alternative de nition, the information is not taken from the typical instances, but from the instances immediately above the instance in consideration. In this case the de nition looks as follows: )) and 2. for all predicates P with @I(P(a1; : : : ; an)) = undef, for all i, the bi are least instances such that @I(ai) v @I(bi) and @I(P(b1; : : : ; bn)) 6 = undef holds if I 0 (P (a1; : : : ; an)) = inj(@ I(P(b1; : : : ; bn))) then I(P(a1; : : : ; an)) = inj(@ I(P(b1; : : : ; bn))). 2. for all predicates P with @I(P(a 1 ; : : : ; a n )) = undef; for all i, the b i are typical instances such that @I(a i ) v @I(b i ) and @I(P(b 1 ; : : : ; b n )) 6 = undef and P is relevant for the b i then holds:
if I 0 (P (a 1 ; : : : ; a n )) = inj(@ I(P(b 1 ; : : : ; b n ))) then I(P(a 1 ; : : : ; a n )) = inj(@ I(P(b 1 ; : : : ; b n ))). 3. an analogous relation holds for functions f (replace undef by ?.)
That is, in minimal models all relevant information that is not xed by the knowledge base is transferred from typical instances.
Here is an example of how the semantics works The propositional subsystem consists, as usual, of a set ? of (sorted rst order) formulae. Aspects, as mentioned above, can be de ned in this subsystem. The propositionally represented connections of aspects|as far as they are available| belong to this subsystem as well.
The Conceptual Subsystem
We extend the knowledge base by a conceptual part consisting of concept structures which are non-propositional representations of concepts. We use directed acyclic graphs consisting of a set of instances and the typicality relation v C as concept structures.
The instances themselves might be represented by neural nets, maps, diagrams or some other means including symbolic representations. The particular type of these representations is of no concern for the rest of the paper. We consider concepts C to be represented by a set of instances with a partial order v c .
The elements of these concept structures represent concept instances. A concept structure is displayed as a directed acyclic graph as in gure 1. In this city example, the instances are not directly represented as maps, but we deal with another concept representation which is similar to that employed by Barwise and Etchemendy 3]. It encodes instances as tables. Nevertheless, the conceptual part of the knowledge base is non-propositional because of the concept structure.
The Reasoner
In order to integrate the conceptual subsystem into the framework, its informational content has to be accessible. The semantics corresponds exactly to the semantics given in section 3. Several inspection procedures work on the conceptual subsystem and provide the information that is needed by the rules of the reasoner:
{ A TYP-procedure provides access to the structural content of the concept structures in that it nds a typical instance s with t v C s for an instance t of a concept C. AR infers by analogy carshRomei = carshMadridi.
Hence it is possible to infer carshRomei = no of cars(x; 1million)
The AT rule of the reasoner takes as inputs: { a typical instance s with t v C s which is computed by the TYP-procedure, and { information about the relevancy of A 2 for this s. This information is either extracted by the RELV-procedure or explicitly represented in the propositional part of the knowledge base as, e.g., suggested by Gentner 10] .
The AT rule then infers A 2 hti = A 2 hsi. Using the additional information about the actual value of A 2 hsi, which is computed by the ASP-procedure, A 2 hti can be inferred.
Let us look at an example where the individual concept structure of the concept city is given. We want to compute A 2 hti = public transportationhRomei by analogy to a typical city. If there is no explicit connection for public transportation, then AR cannot be applied and we proceed as follows: { The TYP-procedure computes the typical instance Berlin as a typical city that is rated over Rome.
{ RELV tests whether public transportation is a relevant aspect for Berlin. Provided that the result is true, AT yields public transportationhBerlini = public transportationhRomei.
{ With the additional information public transportationhBerlini = (subway(x)^bus(x)^taxi(x)^airport(x)) which is provided by the ASP-procedure or explicitly given in the propositional subsystem, we infer public transportationhRomei = (subway(x)b us(x)^taxi(x)^airport(x)) by analogy. At a glance: let the following information be given relevant(public transportation; Berlin) typex(Berlin) and Romev city Berlin. public transportationhBerlini = public transportationhRomei = (subway(x)^bus(x)t axi(x)^airport(x)) ?
AT infers by analogy public transportationhBerlini = public transportationhRomei:
Hence it is possible to infer public transportationhRomei = (subway(x)^bus(x)^taxi(x)^airport(x)):
5 Conclusion
In this paper we discussed two di erent kinds of analogical reasoning, connectionbased analogical reasoning and analogical reasoning based on typical instances. The non-monotonicity of the connection-based analogical inferences stems from the justifying connections that represent the relevance of an aspect for another aspect. On the other hand, the non-monotonicity of the analogical inference based on typical instances is caused by the knowledge about the relevance of an aspect for a typical instance of a concept. For the latter we presented an appropriate semantics that is a special case of Shoham's minimal model semantics. The paper dealt with two di erent analogical inference schemas and with their computational realization in a hybrid framework that is equipped with di erent kinds of knowledge representation. Related work with typical instances has been done for the machine learning systems protos and cobweb 2, 8] that also use a representations of concepts with typical instances.
